

# AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD

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 **Routledge**  
Taylor & Francis Group  
New York London

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## Doctrinal Unilateralism and Its Limits: America and Global Governance in the New Century

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This chapter assesses the shift toward American unilateralism during the first administration of President George W. Bush and what it means for global governance. I am not interested in routine unilateral acts, which are a standard practice of states, especially when taken in self-defense. The particular form of unilateralism that concerns me here is the doctrinal belief that the use of American power abroad is entirely self-legitimizing, requiring no recourse to the views or interests of others and permitting no external constraints on its self-ascribed aims. By global governance, in turn, I mean the constellation of treaty-based and customary international law, shared norms, institutions, and practices by which the international community as a whole seeks to manage its common affairs.

Are America and global governance on a collision course? If so, how did that come to be? And what are the consequences—for the United States and for the rest of the world?

This chapter has two aims, the first of which is to place the resurgence of American doctrinal unilateralism into its historical and conceptual contexts, in the hope that doing so will help us to understand it better. The second goal is to argue that, despite the vast power asymmetries that exist between the United States and the rest of the world, especially in the military realm, it is not as easy as it may seem at first blush for the United States to sustain such a unilateralist posture today. One major reason, ironically, is the success of America's own post-World War II strategy of creating an integrated global order, inhabited by a diversity of state and nonstate actors and based on the animating principles—if not always the practice—of democracy, the rule of law, and multilateralism. Thus, the United States is locked in a struggle today not only with its allies and other states but also with the results of its own creation—and, in that sense, with its own sense of self as a nation.

### On Change and Continuity

*Diplomatic History*, the official journal of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, published a roundtable discussion recently about what is new and what is not in the foreign policy of President George W. Bush, focused in particular on its unilateralism.<sup>1</sup> Melvyn Leffler, a realist by orientation and whose introductory essay is the focal point for the debate, stresses elements of continuity: Samuel Flagg Bemis, Leffler reminds us, described Theodore Roosevelt's interventions in the Caribbean and Central America as *protective imperialism*. "... The wise men of the Harry Truman administration worked brilliantly to forge alliances, but they never foreswore the right to act unilaterally. When they perceived threats, especially in the Third World, U.S. officials during the Cold War did not refrain from acting unilaterally"—Leffler notes Vietnam in particular. Even President Bill Clinton is said to have followed course, continuing to build up America's military might and to preserve "the right to act unilaterally and to strike preemptively." What did change during the first Bush administration, Leffler concludes, is that the existential threat posed by 9/11 led policymakers to permit the assertion of American ideals and principles, such as liberty and democracy promotion, to trump the "careful calculation of interests [that] is essential to discipline American power and temper its ethnocentrism." But he finds ample historical precedent for that tendency as well at previous points of major crisis.<sup>2</sup>

Other contributors to the roundtable criticize Leffler from both sides. One charges him contentiously with not identifying and explaining yet a deeper, and different, source of continuity: "*choosing* a war nearly every generation seem[s] to be part of *core U.S. national identity*."<sup>3</sup> Most of the others accuse him of overlooking critical discontinuities. Says one, "If policy has only been recalibrated [by the Bush administration] rather than changed, why are we discussing [it] in these papers and why are so many foreign policy historians and analysts expressing concern?"<sup>4</sup>

As illuminating as this debate may be, ultimately it remains unsatisfactory because the narratives it presents are conceptually thin, and its core analytical elements are underspecified. Thus, I propose to view the issue of American unilateralism through somewhat more refined lenses, thereby constructing some building blocks of an argument that should permit a more systematic assessment of recent trends in U.S. foreign policy—and their sustainability in the years ahead.

### American Exceptionalism

As a nation, America was not only born free, Robert Keohane once remarked; it was also "born lucky."<sup>5</sup> For much of its history before the turn of the twentieth century, the United States—far removed from the constant jostling of European power politics, heavily self-sufficient, able to grow into continental

scale, protected by oceans on either side and adjoined by relatively weak and usually friendly neighbors to the north and south, and a magnet attracting a constant inflow of newcomers eager to make a fresh start—luxuriated in the posture described by John Quincy Adams of being “the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all . . . the champion and vindicator only of her own.”<sup>6</sup> Thus, America’s traditional aversion to “entangling alliances,” first expressed in George Washington’s farewell address, flowed naturally from its geopolitical constitution.<sup>7</sup> By 1823, the United States felt sure enough of itself for President James Monroe to enunciate the doctrine that the United States would view as “an unfriendly disposition” any European intervention in the Americas, though until the end of the nineteenth century the British navy, for reasons of its own, undoubtedly played a greater role in safeguarding the Monroe Doctrine than did the United States itself.

By the turn of the century, however, the world was closing in on the United States. On September 5, 1901, President William McKinley delivered a major address on America’s new role in the world at the new century’s first world’s fair in Buffalo, New York. “God and men have linked nations together,” he said. “No nation can longer be indifferent to any other.”<sup>8</sup> The very next day, at the same place, McKinley was assassinated, making Theodore Roosevelt (or TR as he was known) the nation’s president. TR picked up on McKinley’s theme and carried it a step further a few months later in his first State of the Union message: “The increasing interdependence and complexity of international political and economic relations,” he declared, “render it incumbent on all civilized and orderly powers to insist on the proper policing of the world.”<sup>9</sup> The dilemma, however, was how to interest an unconcerned country—the Congress as well as the public—in that mission.

For the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations the issue initially was quite unproblematic: The United States would have to behave like other great powers, for the simple reason that it, like the European great powers, was affected by and in turn helped shape the global balance of power. It alone would decide when and how to act abroad in accordance with its self-defined interests. And so McKinley took the country on a brief imperialist fling following the Spanish–American War of 1898, fought on flawed if not false premises; he also annexed Hawaii and the Philippines while making a protectorate of Cuba. For his part, TR instigated the creation of the state of Panama and built the isthmus canal, and he issued a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, whereby the United States claimed the right to intervene in the affairs of its southern neighbors. For good measure, TR sent the entire American fleet on a symbolic around-the-world cruise to demonstrate that the United States had arrived as a global player.

But the “fever of imperialism,” as David Fromkin describes it,<sup>10</sup> died down quickly, stymied by Congressional purse strings and declining public interest, though interventions in Central America and the Caribbean continued in

response to real and imagined threats to the security of the canal and the sanctity of American investments. In short, while the United States was becoming increasingly powerful, conventional *raison d'état* as a basis for global engagement held little allure for the American people, who refused to see their nation as a normal great power, doing what great powers supposedly did.

Teddy Roosevelt was frustrated by this lack of interest in global engagement, but in the process he also discovered one promising way to mobilize the country behind that agenda—by tapping into strains of American exceptionalism.<sup>11</sup> Searching for the right formula, he invoked, with equal enthusiasm, a mixture of piety, patriotism, and jingoism—so much so that, in John Milton Cooper's biography of TR and Woodrow Wilson, it is a toss-up who ends up the “priest” and who the “warrior.”<sup>12</sup> Thus, Roosevelt was the first American leader to propose a league of nations as early as 1914, calling it a “World League for the Peace of Righteousness” and saying that it would work like that familiar American institution, “a posse comitatus.”<sup>13</sup>

Wilson, of course, went considerably further, promising to make the world safe for a whole panoply of American values and to enshrine that promise in a new international system—thereby generating the doctrine that still bears his name. When Wilson asked Congress on April 2, 1917, to declare war on imperial Germany, he stated solemnly that if America must shed blood, it would be “for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.”<sup>14</sup> But with geography and neutrality no longer able to protect the United States and World War I having demonstrated that the balance-of-power system was doomed to failure, Wilson concluded that to achieve these aims “we must have a society of nations” built on premises the American people could recognize as their own.<sup>15</sup>

And so, via the route of American exceptionalism, the world got its first general-purpose multilateral institution, the League of Nations—albeit without U.S. membership. Conventional wisdom has it that Wilson's plans were stymied by the lure of isolationism. The reality is a good deal more complex. According to Lawrence Gelfand, a highly regarded Wilson scholar, “existing evidence, essentially the considered judgment of seasoned politicians and journalists in the fall of 1918 and well into the spring of 1919, pointed toward solid public support for American membership in the League of Nations.”<sup>16</sup> Moreover, there were barely more than a dozen hard-core irreconcilables in the Senate who were opposed to U.S. membership in a league of any form. Henry Cabot Lodge, chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, was prepared to vote for the League and to deliver enough Republican votes to ratify the treaty, provided that Wilson accepted Lodge's reservations. In essence, they came down to this nonnegotiable issue: in Lodge's words, to “release us from

obligations which might not be kept, and to preserve rights which ought not to be infringed.”<sup>17</sup> But this was not isolationism; it was unilateralism. Wilson’s inability or unwillingness to compromise, coupled with his rapidly declining health that cut short his campaign for the League, doomed the effort.<sup>18</sup>

Isolationism was not the cause of treaty’s defeat, then; it was its consequence. But the two were often hard to distinguish. For example, Senator William Borah, one of the few isolationist leaders seriously interested in foreign affairs, sounded very much like Lodge when he insisted that the United States “does propose ... to determine for itself when civilization is threatened, when there may be a breach of human rights and human liberty sufficient to warrant action, and it proposes also to determine for itself when to act and in what manner it shall discharge the obligation which time and circumstances impose.”<sup>19</sup> The trouble was that, until the direct attack on Pearl Harbor twenty-seven months into World War II, no international threat was ever deemed to pass that threshold.

As a result, for Franklin Roosevelt (also known as FDR), the key postwar challenge was to overcome the isolationist legacy of the 1930s and to ensure sustained U.S. engagement in achieving and maintaining a stable international order. He, like Wilson and TR before him, recognized that the American people needed an animating vision beyond the mere dictates of balance-of-power politics—the failure of which had dragged America into two world wars in the span of a single generation. Thus, FDR, too, framed his plans for winning the peace in terms he believed would resonate with the public: creating an American-led order based on relatively modest forms of constitutionalism: that is, rules and institutions promoting human betterment through provisions for a collective security organization grafted onto a concert of power; stable money and free trade; human rights and decolonization; and an international civic politics beyond the domain of states through active engagement by the private and voluntary sectors.

FDR’s postwar plans were tempered by a far greater pragmatic appreciation of domestic and international political realities than Wilson had exhibited. Moreover, they were intended not only to secure American engagement abroad but also to safeguard the aims and achievements of the New Deal at home. That combination of commitments yielded the United Nations (UN), including its socioeconomic agencies, the Bretton Woods institutions, negotiations on an international trade organization (which produced the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT, later folded into the World Trade Organization), and, in due course, the transnational expansion of U.S. corporations and civil society organizations.

And so it went on into the beginnings of the Cold War. When Soviet vetoes in the UN Security Council blocked the effective use of the UN in the late 1940s, Truman took the concept of collective security regional in Western Europe where the need to respond to the Soviets was greatest, creating the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It is worth recalling today that leading unilateralists at the time opposed NATO's core commitment, and why.

In the Senate, Robert A. Taft of Ohio, known as Mr. Republican, voted against NATO despite being a strident anticommunist because, he said, "I do not like the obligation written into the pact which binds us to come to the defense of any country, no matter by whom it is attacked and even though the aggressor may be another member of the pact."<sup>20</sup> That is, Taft objected precisely to the multilateral character of NATO's security commitments, the very feature differentiating it from all previous alliances in history.<sup>21</sup> George Kennan, the author of America's postwar containment strategy vis-à-vis the Soviets, protested for the same reason. Both preferred specific bilateral alliances as needed based on what Keenan called "particularized" rather than "legalistic-moralistic" commitments, which is how he saw NATO.<sup>22</sup>

But the "unis" lost and the "multis" won.<sup>23</sup> Because they did, a North Atlantic security community gradually came into being: a grouping of states among which the recourse to war as a means to settle differences is unthinkable—a mission backed by every subsequent administration from Dwight Eisenhower on down and that may well be America's single most important achievement ever in the international arena.

Like Leffler, I have identified elements of continuity in American foreign policy since the United States became a world power, but my thread of continuity is quite different from his. At critical junctures when the international order was being remade, U.S. leaders from TR to Wilson and from FDR to Truman have espoused international arrangements—multilateral arrangements—they believed resonated with the American public by reflecting core elements of America's own self of sense as a nation and that would help sustain, therefore, constructive U.S. engagement in the affairs of the world. Presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton drew on a similar ideational repository to frame their visions for world order at the end of the Cold War.<sup>24</sup> The transformational effects of those arrangements are unfolding still.

Debates about these issues among international relations scholars often get bogged down on several closely related questions. One is whether these leaders really meant what they said or merely invoked certain rhetoric and images for instrumental reasons. For the purposes of the present discussion this question is fundamentally irrelevant, because by acting on their rhetoric and images they created a reality that otherwise would not have existed. For example, the indivisible or collective security guarantees in NATO—that an attack on one would be considered an attack on all—created a different reality in Europe than two or three bilateral alliances would have done; one needs only to compare Europe with East Asia today to appreciate the difference.<sup>25</sup>

Another question has to do with power: the United States, it is frequently said, did what it did because it could. But this is a mere truism. Its profound limitations become clear when one considers that no other power of comparable

magnitude would have done the same things. Nazi Germany was not about to construct a liberal international economic order or to advance the cause of human rights had it won the war, nor were the Soviets, had they ended up on top. Indeed, even the United Kingdom would have done some things differently, especially with regard to maintaining colonialism and imperial preferences.<sup>26</sup>

That brings us, finally, to the hoary subject of interests. Yes, the United States fully pursued its interests as determined by its political leaders. But by virtue of its power it had available to it a fairly broad repertoire of means by which to pursue those interests. I have suggested that the ideational factor of American identity—the nation’s sense of exceptionalism—shaped how interests were defined and pursued. Broadly speaking, and unusual for a great power, the United States created a rule-based system that encouraged not only acquiescence but also active participation by other and lesser powers, who saw their own interests taken into account and were given an institutionalized hearing in the system’s management. It goes without saying that the United States, in Leffler’s words, “preserved the right” to act unilaterally—and some of its lesser foreign policy successes occurred when it did so act, including U.S.-sponsored coups from Iran to Chile; U.S. support for military dictators and other forms of autocracy; and the long and deeply divisive Vietnam War. But insofar as the U.S.-created multilateral order enjoyed widespread legitimacy abroad, America’s “soft power” resources remained plentiful.<sup>27</sup>

### **American Exemptionalism**

So far, I have suggested that the promotion of multilateralism at key moments in the twentieth century reflected and drew upon a sense of American exceptionalism, helping to constitute the post-World War II international order. But this narrative is incomplete. For, from the very outset of the postwar era, the United States also has sought to insulate itself from the domestic blowback of some of the multilateral instruments it created, especially in the area of human rights and on the question of international jurisdiction. I call this American *exemptionalism*.<sup>28</sup>

Whereas the executive branch traditionally drove the exceptionalist agenda, the exemptionalist resistance to its domestic effects has been anchored in Congress, where it has typically been framed in terms of protecting such core features of the U.S. Constitution as the separation of powers or states’ rights against federal treaty-based incursions. Indeed, serious constitutional issues are at stake in relation to international treaties and, even more so, to the proliferation of customary international law, which have sparked lively and highly productive debates among legal scholars and practitioners in the past several years.<sup>29</sup> The immediate driver of exemptionalism after World War II, however, was the domestic politics of race relations.

In drafting the UN charter, for example, the United States introduced language reaffirming faith in fundamental human rights. But because the support of southern Democrats was critical to the charter's ratification by the Senate, the need to keep Jim Crow laws beyond international scrutiny obliged the United States to balance that reaffirmation by adding what became Article 2(7): "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."<sup>30</sup> No international judgment would be passed, in other words, on so-called separate but equal education for black children or on state lynch laws—under which less than 1 percent of lynch murderers were ever tried. The United States could vote for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the UN General Assembly in 1948 because it was a statement of aspirations, which created no binding legal obligations and required no ratification.

Race also was at the root of a backlash against the UN Genocide Convention, negotiated by the executive branch. During debates on the convention, Raphael Lemkin—a State Department official and a Jew who invented the term genocide and was the intellectual force behind the convention—found himself in the unenviable position of testifying that genocide occurred only when intent existed to exterminate an entire group, whereas "those who committed lynchings lacked this requisite motivation."<sup>31</sup> Not swayed, the Senate in 1954 nearly adopted the Bricker Amendment, which would have reduced significantly the president's treaty-making powers.<sup>32</sup> Eisenhower just managed to dodge this bullet but in return was forced to withdraw from further efforts to ratify the genocide convention and other UN rights covenants. As a result, the United States only ratified the Genocide Convention in 1989; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1992; and the Convention Against Torture as well as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1994, all with reservations severely limiting—indeed, mostly negating—their domestic legal effects.<sup>33</sup>

During the Cold War, presidents from Truman to Ronald Reagan sought to minimize the international embarrassment resulting from exemptionism, especially regarding human rights, often acting through executive agreements or other such means. The United States was, after all, in a contest *vis-à-vis* the Soviets for the hearts and minds of people throughout the world. Washington was especially concerned that the non-white third-world not tilt toward the communist cause. So although such presidents as John F. Kennedy might have been slow to embrace fully the need for change on racial issues at home, they were acutely concerned to manage the fallout from domestic racism abroad.<sup>34</sup>

A half-century after the Bricker Amendment, race is no longer the driver behind exemptionism that it once was. Today it is animated by a more diffuse set of social issues including abortion, capital punishment, gay rights, gun control, unfettered property rights, and, thus, opposition to environmental

regulations—coupled with distrust of government and even more so of international institutions and treaties. But the geographic locus of exemptionalism has not moved far. A look at an electoral map of the United States today suggests that the core of red-state America resides in the old isolationist regions of the Midwest and mountain states and in the deep South, which had forced the coupling of the postwar multilateralist agenda with exemptionalism in the first place, before its conversion away from the political coalition FDR had constructed toward the Republican Party, partly as a result of the racial and cultural turmoil of the late 1960s that became the basis for Richard Nixon's so-called southern strategy.<sup>35</sup>

### Doctrinal Unilateralism Today

Signs of a resurgent doctrinal unilateralism go back to the first Reagan administration: withholding assessed contributions to the United Nations; walking away from the International Court of Justice when it ruled adversely in *Nicaragua v. the United States*; rejecting the Law of the Sea Treaty negotiated over many years by presidents of both parties; attacking the Bretton Woods institutions; expressing deep ambivalence about nuclear deterrence, as opposed to superiority, as well as about arms control; and justifying these policy postures by virtue of America's special provenance as the shining "city on a hill," an exemplar to others. But in his second term both Reagan and his foreign policy advisers steered back closer to the postwar norm, even urging Congress to pay to the UN arrears the United States had accumulated in his first term.

Inspired by and hoping to sustain the Reagan revolution, as it was then known, conservative think tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Heritage Foundation from the 1980s on began to develop a doctrinal basis for a new American unilateralism to undermine and dismantle the postwar consensus. The doctrine came in two related parts: the unfettered use of American power abroad coupled with a radical exemptionalism of the United States from the international normative sphere.

As John Bolton wrote not long before he left AEI to join the George W. Bush administration as a senior State Department official, "the harm and costs to the United States of [globalists] belittling our popular sovereignty and constitutionalism, and restricting both our domestic and our international policy flexibility and power are finally receiving attention."<sup>36</sup> The UN has been a leading target of this attention for daring to pronounce on such questions as when the use of force may or may not be legitimate.<sup>37</sup> But the European Union is also seen as posing a serious danger, not only because it has, according to Jeremy Rabkin, "many practical ramifications for U.S. policy. But it also presents a clear ideological alternative"—above all, by its members adhering to more active social policies while agreeing to pool aspects of their sovereignty to achieve their everyday policy aims.<sup>38</sup> Adds Bolton, presumably referring to the International Criminal Court, "Not content alone with transferring their

own national sovereignty to Brussels, [the EU has] also decided, in effect, to transfer some of ours to worldwide institutions and norms.”<sup>39</sup>

The exemptionalist component of the new unilateralist doctrine kicked in first, in the form of a “new sovereigntist” defense of American institutions against alleged international encroachment.<sup>40</sup> Rabkin writes, in a somewhat circular fashion, “because the United States is fully sovereign, it can determine for itself what its Constitution will require. And the Constitution necessarily requires that sovereignty be safeguarded so that the Constitution itself can be secure.”<sup>41</sup> The practical steps that follow from this axiom include rejecting multilateral treaties, declaring illegitimate a good deal of what is said to be customary international law, diminishing the role of multilateral institutions, and above all delegitimizing the International Criminal Court—going so far as to punish smaller and weaker countries that do sign up to it, even to the detriment of other U.S. foreign policy objectives such as drug interdiction and co-opting their militaries.<sup>42</sup>

These policy preferences began to prevail in Congress after the 1994 midterm elections, when Republicans took control of both houses of Congress. That election had been nationalized by means of a common Republican platform termed “Contract with America,” which claimed, among other things, that “the Clinton administration appears to salute the day when American men and women will fight, and die, ‘in the service’ of the United Nations.”<sup>43</sup> The Senate subsequently rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and made it clear that it would not ratify the international inspections provisions of the biological weapons convention. A straw poll in that chamber indicated that the Kyoto protocol would face a similar fate, even before George W. Bush rejected it altogether. Clinton did not dare submit the International Criminal Court statute for ratification, knowing that it was dead on arrival. And withholding UN dues became transformed from a targeted policy instrument in the Reagan years to a common Congressional pastime. Bolton noted these developments approvingly: “Recent clashes in and around the United States Senate indicate that the Americanist party has awakened.”<sup>44</sup>

After the election of Bush in 2000, the new unilateralism moved into the White House as well, and with it the second part of the doctrinal shift: proclaiming the view that the use of American power abroad is entirely self-legitimizing, determined solely by U.S. interests, neither requiring nor welcoming any form of external accountability. The administration’s new national security strategy expressed the aim of perpetual U.S. military predominance while also promulgating the highly controversial concept of *preventive*, in contrast to *preemptive*, warfare.<sup>45</sup> The strategy document assigned no role to multilateralism and, indeed, acknowledged no serious need for international support. The administration risked the NATO alliance to fight an elective war in Iraq on flawed premises and before other means had been exhausted. And its aggressive treatment of prisoners of war, who were placed in a legal limbo that

seemed deliberately designed to escape the provisions of the Geneva conventions, raised serious questions abroad about America's commitment to the rule of law.

Some scholars, including Leffler, often cite the terrorist attacks on 9/11 to explain this shift. 9/11 did represent a profoundly different type of threat and vulnerability for America, but many of the administration's policy postures preceded the attacks, so they can hardly have been the cause. Another popular argument, especially in the run-up to the Iraq War, is the unprecedented power gap between the United States and everyone else. In the transatlantic context, as Robert Kagan put it evocatively, Americans are from Mars, and Europeans are from Venus.<sup>46</sup> The United States is militarily powerful; Europe, in relative terms, is weak. So it is axiomatic that America would use force and project power to pursue its interests, downplaying norms and institutions, while Europe stresses diplomacy and writes checks. America is unilateral because it can be; Europe favors multilateralism because it must. But this reasoning is deeply flawed.

About the power asymmetry there can be no dispute. The United States now spends nearly as much on its military as the rest of the world combined, yet that still consumes less than 5 percent of its gross domestic product. The gap in technology and combat experience is even greater. Policy differences inevitably will result from an asymmetry of this magnitude, but permissive conditions do not constitute causal factors. Yes, the United States can do many of the things Kagan and other neoconservatives ascribe to it, including prosecuting what some among them have happily described as a policy of "democratic imperialism"—reminiscent of Bemis's characterization of some of TR's policies. But it follows that it neither must nor will do those things by virtue of its power differential alone.

Consider the fact that, for all practical purposes, the transatlantic power gap was as great in the 1990s as it is a decade later. When the Soviet Union imploded, the American neoconservative commentator Charles Krauthammer already heralded the advent of what he called "the unipolar moment."<sup>47</sup> Then-secretary of state Madeleine Albright hectored the allies and the United Nations at every opportunity that the United States was "the world's indispensable nation."<sup>48</sup> And Hubert Védrine, French foreign minister at the time, coined the term *hyperpuissance* to express the unique extent of American hegemony even then.<sup>49</sup> Yet transatlantic grumbling was not appreciably worse than in earlier times. And everyone—including the German Red-Green coalition government—was on board for the U.S.-led Kosovo intervention that arguably had less legal justification going for it than the war against Iraq.

The difference is doctrinal. When the Clinton administration reminded the world of America's indispensability, it invariably did so in the context of values and policy objectives broadly shared but not achieved without active U.S. involvement—be they opening global markets, promoting nuclear threat

reduction, fielding robust peacekeeping missions, or sustaining the Middle East peace process. Even American triumphalism in the 1990s—and there was plenty of it—celebrated a shared achievement: the victory of free markets and democratic governance against an adversary the West collectively had combated for much of the twentieth century.

These doctrinal differences, in turn, reflect a deeper political reality. The liberal internationalism on which the postwar consensus ultimately rested has fared no better in recent years than its domestic counterpart: it has lost the war of ideas just as it has lost elections. And doctrinal unilateralism, unlike exemptionalist impulses throughout the Cold War, is unrestrained by the existence of any major countervailing power. Or is it?

### **Transnational Civic Politics**

It is well beyond the scope of this chapter—or my expertise, for that matter—to speculate about the emergence of any countervailing military challengers to the United States down the road, be they other states or the further proliferation of and collaboration among terrorist networks. But I do want to address briefly certain forms of transnational social power: new platforms and channels of transnational action the U.S. state cannot fully control, which are deeply entwined with American society itself and which in considerable measure represent the success of America's own postwar international agenda. They include the spread of democracy and the rule of law, more robust norms in areas ranging from human rights to the use of force, international institutions like the UN, and the fact that nonstate actors such as nongovernmental organizations and transnational firms are increasingly involved in the promotion and production of global public goods. As a result of these developments, even as doctrinal unilateralism has sought to disembed the United States from postwar multilateral norms and frameworks, the very system of states slowly is becoming embedded within an increasingly mobilized and institutionalized global public domain, and subject to a rudimentary transnational civic politics.<sup>50</sup> We see evidence of this at work in several recent developments, including the highly contentious Iraq War and its aftermath, as well as the fight over Kyoto.

I draw three lessons from Iraq for the purposes of this discussion. First, Iraq demonstrates the fact that there is no automatic relationship between power and international legitimacy—and that legitimacy matters. One state can amass force, but only others can endow its deployment with legitimacy. The United States ignored that rule in Iraq and has paid the price in blood and treasure, with little meaningful help even now from anyone but the British, and they desperately wanted the cover of a second Security Council resolution before going to war.

It is true that the successful use of force can produce legitimacy over time, when and if opposition collapses. The U.S. “quarantine” of Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis may well have been illegal (an interference with shipping on

the high seas) and perhaps unwise (drawing a line in the ocean and then leaving it up to the Soviets to decide on peace or war).<sup>51</sup> But it ended up producing agreement and deference, including from all members of the Organization of American States except for Cuba. However, there is nothing automatic about this process. Soviet control over the Baltic states and Eastern Europe during the long Cold War did not lead to international legitimacy in the view of many important actors, which contributed to the ultimate collapse of the Soviet empire.

And attaining legitimacy is not simply a mechanical exercise, such as counting votes in the UN Security Council. After all, the council did not authorize NATO's Kosovo campaign, yet U.S. allies and arguably even the UN itself regarded that as a legitimate act. When Russia presented a draft resolution condemning NATO's bombing, the council voted it down by 12–3, thus in a backhanded way belatedly conferring legitimacy on the bombing campaign.

Instead, legitimacy typically emerges out of a process of persuasion in which the relevant others look for evidence that power, especially military force, is used in pursuit of broadly shared aims and in accordance with broadly accepted norms. In Iraq the United States failed to persuade much of the international community on (1) the most serious weapons of mass destruction charges; (2) stopping the weapons inspections; (3) the concept of preventive war; and (4) marginalizing the political role of the UN. Indeed, it is little remembered that, apart from a threatened French veto, the United States was unable to garner eight votes on a UN Security Council that included some of the world's poorest and therefore presumably most susceptible countries—precisely because other states viewed Iraq as a test case for preventive warfare and they had no desire to endorse any such notion.<sup>52</sup> Thus, although the United States is powerful enough to go to war and to succeed in major combat operations on its own, it is not so powerful as to compel others to buy into or support its mission.<sup>53</sup> Only others can do that. That is one lesson from Iraq.

A second lesson from Iraq is that as the number of democracies in the world continues to increase, so too will the demand for not only internal but also external accountability of states. Neoconservative pundits like William Kristol and Robert Kagan are among the most vocal advocates of democracy promotion abroad. Yet in their vigorous advocacy of and support for the Iraq War, they expressed little more than contempt for public opinion abroad, not appreciating the indivisible link between the two.

In the run-up to the war the United States had the most trouble not with authoritarian states or kleptocracies but with other democracies—and not only in “old Europe” France and Germany, as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld put it so indelicately, but also in Canada, Chile, Mexico, and Turkey.<sup>54</sup> Neither neoconservative pundits nor unilateralist members of Congress may care what people elsewhere think of the United States. But leaders

of other democracies must be concerned with what their own people think about them if they are to survive politically. Very few such leaders will risk siding with the United States when two-thirds or more voters in their countries oppose U.S. policy. And reputable polls have shown that favorable attitudes toward the United States in most countries surveyed have sunken to all-time lows.<sup>55</sup>

In sum, America's success at promoting democracy abroad has the inexorable effect of constraining the United States from deviating too far from international norms if it desires or needs the help of others—or of imposing significant costs on the United States if it chooses to go it alone.

But America's Iraq problems did not stop with other states and their publics, and therein lies the third lesson. The American state is increasingly bumping into the interests of the U.S.-based global business community. During the Iraq War, the *Financial Times* reported that “big American consumer brands such as Coca-Cola, McDonald's, and Marlboro are paying a price as boycotts spread from the Middle East to the rest of the world, especially Europe.”<sup>56</sup> In 2004, Control Risks Group, a thoroughly mainstream British business risk consultancy, described U.S. foreign policy as “the most important single factor driving the development of global [business] risk. By using U.S. power unilaterally and aggressively in pursuit of global stability, the Bush administration is in fact creating precisely the opposite effect.”<sup>57</sup> At some point, the corporate sector can be expected to resist the imposition of these costs.

Beyond the Iraq War, climate change politics illustrates similar points and also highlights the role of nongovernmental organizations. When Bush rejected the Kyoto protocol, several major oil companies lobbied the U.S. Congress for voluntary greenhouse-gas limits. Shell and BP were among them, both of which enjoy carefully cultivated “green” images, have instituted company-wide emissions reductions programs, have invested heavily in alternative energy sources, and have feared suffering competitive disadvantages. So, too, was Enron, hoping to become a major player in an expanding global emissions trading market.<sup>58</sup> European activist groups, for their part, organized a boycott of Esso, a subsidiary of ExxonMobil, one of Kyoto's most determined opponents. Now that Kyoto is in force without U.S. adherence, Jeffrey Immelt, chief executive officer of GE, an American company whose merger with another U.S. firm was blocked by the European Commission and who therefore understands well the consequences of operating a global firm in conflicting regulatory environments, has called for a consistent transatlantic policy on producing cleaner energy: “For us to remain competitive, we simply cannot navigate a regulatory maze that forces us to tweak and modulate every product and process to suit individual regulatory regimes at their whim.” Moreover, Immelt laments the fact that, as a result of policy failure by the United States, “the U.S. has watched Europe and others advance, strengthening their economies and security.”<sup>59</sup>

Likewise, the number of shareholder resolutions demanding climate change risk policies from American companies doubled in just one year, while lawsuits were filed against the federal government as well as firms. Swiss Re, one of the world's largest insurers, requested information from all energy-intensive firms for which it provides liability coverage, regarding whether they have a carbon accounting or reporting system in place and how they intend to meet their obligations under Kyoto or any similar such instrument—implying that rates and even coverage could be affected.

Meanwhile, in the governmental arena fully half of all U.S. states by now have introduced so-called son-of-Kyoto bills, aiming to build state-based frameworks for regulating CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, and the automakers are suing California to invalidate its proposed regulations. Environmental groups support the campaign hoping that it will generate industry demands for uniform federal standards rather than face a proliferation of individual states' standards. Adding to the transnational mix, Canada has adopted California's targets. Actions such as these in and of themselves are no substitute for a viable climate treaty. But they do alter the structure of incentives and the political balance of power in this space so that sooner rather than later any U.S. administration will have to come to grips with climate change by means of a binding global instrument.

These and other cases like it demonstrate that the transnational manifestations of American exceptionalism continue to survive—and in some respects thrive—even as its exemptionalist counterpart currently is in the ascendancy at home.

## Conclusion

Two Americas stand astride the global stage today: America the exceptionalist and America the exemptionalist; the legacy of institutionalized multilateralism and the new assertion of doctrinal unilateralism. The unfolding of the dialectic between the two will have a fundamental impact on the future evolution of global governance. When Bush sent Bolton to the United Nations, many observers concluded that the game was up. But putting aside symbolism and transaction costs, Bolton probably can do less serious damage at the UN than in the Department of State.

In other respects, early in its second term the Bush administration exhibited signs of modifying some previous stances. Finding itself largely alone in a struggle in Iraq that continues to be far more challenging than anticipated has imposed enormous costs in American treasure and lives, generating growing disaffection among the American public and making it less likely that the Iraq campaign will become the legitimizing affirmation of the administration's new doctrine. Bush and his new foreign policy team, firmly led by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, seem more solicitous of the European allies and are working well with them on the Iran nuclear file. The administration also is

cooperating with regional allies and China in dealing with the North Korean nuclear threat. It opposed Congressional efforts to begin yet another round of withholding UN payments linked to the oil-for-food scandal. And perhaps most significant in some respects, the administration permitted the UN Security Council to refer the Darfur genocide to the International Criminal Court, thereby adding to the court's stature despite having spent the previous four years maligning and undermining it.<sup>60</sup>

In broader Republican circles, Newt Gingrich, former house speaker and an architect of the party's 1994 "Contract with America," cochaired a congressionally mandated bipartisan commission in 2005 that urged serious U.S. engagement with the UN, based on its assessment of American interests.<sup>61</sup> And in 2004 Kagan, the neoconservative commentator of "Mars and Venus" fame published an article acknowledging, albeit grudgingly, the United States faced a crisis of international legitimacy that adversely affected the successful conduct of foreign policy.<sup>62</sup>

The asymmetry of American power, especially military power, is truly extraordinary—perhaps unprecedented. But its efficacy is bounded and becoming more so, not only because other states get in the way but also because the very system of states is becoming embedded in a broader global public domain and subject to an emerging transnational civic politics. Nowhere is this truer than among the world's democracies, America's closest affinity group.

Unilateralism as routine state practice is a permanent feature of international life, especially in cases of genuine self-defense. But I have suggested that the recent American doctrinal version of it is unsustainable in our interconnected and institutionally pluralistic world. American exceptionalism itself, in the form of linking a special U.S. identity and role to a multilateral world order, has contributed mightily to restraining its exemptionalist counterpart.

## Notes

1. "Diplomatic History Roundtable: The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective," *Diplomatic History* 29 (June 2005).
2. Melvyn P. Leffler, "9/11 and American Foreign Policy," *Diplomatic History* 29 (June 2005), 398, 399, 401, 403, and 413, respectively.
3. Walter L. Hixson, "Leffler Takes a Linguistic Turn," *Diplomatic History* 29 (June 2005), 420, italics in original.
4. Anna Kasten Nelson, "Continuity and Change in the Age of Unlimited Power," *Diplomatic History* 29 (June 2005), 437.c
5. Robert O. Keohane, "Associative American Development, 1776–1860," in *The Antinomies of Interdependence: National Welfare and the International Division of Labor*, ed. John Gerard Ruggie (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 90. The following paragraphs draw on an earlier discussion in Ruggie, *Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), ch. 1. Also see Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).
6. Walter LaFeber, *The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750* (New York: Norton, 1989), 80.

7. Felix Gilbert, *To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961).
8. David Fromkin, *In the Time of the Americans: The Generation that Changed America's Role in the World* (New York: Knopf, 1995), 23.
9. Robert Dallek, *The American Style of Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 34–35.
10. Fromkin, *In the Time of the Americans*, 12.
11. See further Seymour Martin Lipset, *American Exceptionalism: A Double Edge Sword* (New York: Replica Books, 1998); Charles Lockhart, *The Roots of American Exceptionalism: Institutions, Culture, and Policies* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2003); and Anatol Lieven, *America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
12. John M. Cooper, Jr., *The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983). Henry Kissinger, in contrast, follows the two stereotypes of Roosevelt the realist and Wilson the liberal in *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).
13. Cooper, *Warrior and the Priest*, 281.
14. Thomas J. Knock, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 121–122. Also see Cooper, *Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
15. Knock, *To End All Wars*, 97.
16. Lawrence E. Gelfand, “The Mystique of Wilsonian Statecraft,” *Diplomatic History* 7 (Spring 1983), 89.
17. Knock, *To End All Wars*, 258. If Gelfand’s assessment is right, then Lodge’s opposition to the treaty simply may have been motivated in part by fear of grave partisan disadvantage for the Republicans if Wilson won.
18. For good discussions of the political intricacies and dynamics within Congress, see Cooper, *Breaking the Heart of the World*; and the earlier but still valuable Lloyd E. Ambrosius, *Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
19. Manfred Jonas, *Isolationism in America* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966), 7.
20. Robert A. Taft, *A Foreign Policy for Americans* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1951), 88–89.
21. The institutional differences between bilateral alliances and collective security can be put schematically: in both instances, state A is pledged to come to aid of state B if B is attacked by C. In a collective security scheme, however, A is also pledged to come to the aid of C if C is attacked by B. Consequently, as Hudson points out, “A cannot regard itself as the ally of B more than of C because theoretically it is an open question whether, if an act of war should occur, B or C would be the aggressor. In the same way B has indeterminate obligations toward A and C, and C toward A and B, and so on, with a vast number of variants as the system is extended to more and more states.” G. F. Hudson, “Collective Security and Military Alliances,” in *Diplomatic Investigations*, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Marin Wight (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 176–177.
22. Anders Stephanson, *Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 140. In his memoirs, Kennan recalled that he had favored a dumbbell arrangement, but one in which the two sides of the Atlantic would be linked not by a treaty but merely by a U.S.–Canadian guarantee of assistance in case of Soviet attack. George F. Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925–1950* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 406–407.
23. The reasons are too complex to elaborate fully here, but they included the critical fact that the idea of a U.S.–led UN collective security system had converted prewar isolationist figures like Arthur Vandenberg (R-Mich), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to the internationalist cause, and when that system turned out not to work as planned he led the campaign for NATO in the Senate. See Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988).
24. Lack of space prohibits a further discussion here, but see Ruggie, “The Past as Prologue? Interests, Identity, and American Foreign Policy,” *International Security* 21 (Spring 1997), 89–125.
25. See Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” *International Organization* 56 (Autumn 2002), 575–607.

26. Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," *International Organization* 46 (Summer 1992), 561–598.
27. On the legitimacy of the postwar multilateral order, see Ruggie, "Multilateralism"; G. John Ikenberry, "Is American Multilateralism in Decline?" *Perspectives on Politics* 1 (September 2003), 533–550; and Edward Luck's chapter in this volume. On soft power, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
28. For a discussion in the context of human rights, see Ruggie, "American Exceptionalism, Exemptionalism and Global Governance," in *American Exceptionalism and Human Rights*, ed. Michael Ignatieff (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).
29. The conventional liberal internationalist view has been challenged most notably by Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, "Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position," *Harvard Law Review* 110 (February 1997) 816–976; Bradley and Goldsmith, "U.N. Human Rights Standards and U.S. Law: The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Litigation," *Fordham Law Review* 66 (November 1997) 319–370; Goldsmith, "Should International Human Rights Law Trump U.S. Domestic Law," *Chicago Journal of International Law* 1 (Fall 2000) 327–340; and Bradley, "International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution," *Stanford Law Review* 55 (May 2003) 1557–1596. For a rejoinder, see Harold Hongju Koh, "Is International Law Really State Law?" *Harvard Law Review* 111 (May 1998) 1824–1861; and Koh, "On American Exceptionalism," *Stanford Law Review* 55 (May 2003) 1476–1527.
30. Carol Anderson, *Eyes Off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944–1955* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), ch. 1; and Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1958), ch. 39. The Soviets and many other states were happy to have the provision included.
31. Anderson, *Eyes Off the Prize*, 228.
32. It was so called for the Ohio Republican who first introduced it in 1951. In addition to the existing ratification requirement of a two-thirds Senate supermajority, the amendment would have required subsequent implementing legislation by both houses of Congress and approval by all state legislatures. A weakened substitute fell one vote short of the required two-thirds. Natalie Hevener Kaufman, *Human Rights Treaties and the Senate: A History of Opposition* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), ch. 4. The amendment would not have affected executive agreements or congressional-executive agreements.
33. Successive administrations largely counted on the domestic political process, including the courts, to achieve progress in these matters. See Koh, "On American Exceptionalism."
34. See Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); and Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).
35. The shift actually began with George Wallace's independent campaign in 1968, which split the white Southern vote and helped deliver the White House to Nixon. Dan T. Carter, *The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995).
36. John R. Bolton, "Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?" *Chicago Journal of International Law* 1 (Fall 2000), 206. Bolton was senior vice president of AEI, became undersecretary of state for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, and is currently serving as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations on a recess appointment by President Bush.
37. I was personally chastised by Bolton when, as assistant secretary-general of the United Nations, I voiced concern in early 1999 over the fact that U.S. intelligence agencies had piggybacked onto UN weapons inspections in Iraq to gather targeting information intended, presumably, for a decapitation strike on the Iraqi leadership. My concern was not with protecting Saddam Hussein or his henchmen; I wanted to point out that it would be tough convincing other countries in the future to accept UN weapons inspections if they could not be counted on to be impartial and stick to their mandate. Thundered Bolton in response, "It is a fundamental and irreparable error to argue that UNSCOM was ever intended to be impartial or strictly technical ... What if instrumentalities of the United Nations were used for American intelligence objectives? What if the information obtained were used for activities outside of UNSCOM's mandate, or any other UN mission? If true, these are facts of life that the United Nations, the secretary general, and everyone else should get used to." Bolton, "The UN Secretary-General versus the United States," *Human Events*, February 5, 1999, 26.

38. Jeremy Rabkin, "Is EU Policy Eroding the Sovereignty of Non-member States?" *Chicago Journal of International Law* 1 (Fall 2000), 273.
39. Bolton, "Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?" 221.
40. Peter J. Spiro seems to have coined the term in his critique, "The New Sovereignists: American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets," *Foreign Affairs* 79 (November–December 2000), 9–15.
41. Rabkin, *Why Sovereignty Matters* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1998); also see Rabkin, "International Law vs. the American Constitution," *National Interest* 55 (Spring 1999), 30–41.
42. On the last of these, see Juan Forero, "Bush's Aid Cuts on Court Issue Roil Neighbors," *New York Times*, August 19, 2005, 1.
43. Ed Gillespie and Bob Schellhas, eds., *Contract with America* (New York: Times Books, 1994), 109.
44. Bolton, "Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?" 206.
45. Preemptive warfare has a well-established international legal pedigree but requires imminence of threat and proportionality of response. After the Iraq War, the administration shifted its rhetoric onto the normatively safer preemptive grounds, but it continued to have a difficult time establishing that the threat the United States faced from Iraq was imminent. On the difference between and respective implications of the two, see Francois Heisbourg, "A Work in Progress: The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences," *Washington Quarterly* 26 (Spring 2003), 75–88; and Anthony Arend, "International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force," *Washington Quarterly* 26 (Spring 2003), 89–103.
46. Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness," *Policy Review* 113 (2002), 3–28.
47. Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70 (1990–1991), 23–32.
48. As the *Toronto Star* put it shortly after her appointment as secretary of state, "It so happens that the phrase 'indispensable nation,' first minted by the new U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, is now used constantly by American officials and commentators to describe the overarching role of the United States in the contemporary world. [It] is triumphalist and irritating—which doesn't mean that it isn't apt. From Bosnia to Haiti, only the U.S. has the will and means to address major global problems." Richard Gwyn, "Annan Shows He's Much More than 'the U.S. Choice,'" *Toronto Star*, December 27, 1996, A31.
49. Hubert Védrine, *Face à l'Hyper-puissance* (Paris: Fayard, 2003); the original essay by that title was published in 1995.
50. For a more sustained discussion, see Ruggie, "Reconstituting the Global Public Domain: Issues, Actors, and Practices," *European Journal of International Relations* 10 (December 2004), 499–531.
51. We now also know that the decision was even more risky than was thought at the time; whereas Kennedy believed the Soviets had not yet deployed missiles on Cuba, they in fact had, thus giving them a much greater retaliatory capability than was assumed.
52. I base this judgment on interviews with council members at the time, including some of America's closest friends.
53. The contrast between the Bush administration's unilateralism in Iraq and the Truman administration's mixture of unilateralism and multilateralism in the Korean War is informative. When confronted with the North Korean invasion of South Korea, Truman unilaterally ordered American forces into the war but immediately sought UN sanction for its actions. Having obtained that approval, the Truman administration proceeded to fight the war as a UN/multilateral operation, even though American commanders de facto controlled its conduct. Truman was thus able to legitimate the defense of South Korea by convincing other nations that their collective security depended on curbing aggression in Northeast Asia. As Western argues in this volume, a similar contrast can be drawn between the elder Bush's patient construction of a broad coalition in the case of the Gulf War and the younger Bush's unilateralist turn in Iraq.
54. In a press conference Rumsfeld tried to dismiss French and German opposition to the administration's Iraq policy by claiming they represented old Europe and that "new Europe" countries like Poland and others supported the United States. At least they did in limited ways and for a limited time.
55. See, for example, the Pew Global Attitudes Project, *What the World Thinks in 2003* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 2003). Also see Steven Kull, "It's Lonely at the Top," *Foreign Policy* 149 (July–August), 36: "A new poll of nearly 24,000 citizens from 23 countries, conducted the international polling firm GlobeScan and the

program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland, suggests that the tectonic plates of world opinion are shifting. People around the world are not only turning away from the United States; they are starting to embrace the leadership of other major powers.”

56. Richard Tomkins, “Anti-war Sentiment Is Likely to Give Fresh Impetus to the Waning Supremacy of U.S. Brands,” *Financial Times*, March 27, 2003, 19.
57. Quoted and summarized in Stephen Fidler and Mark Husband, “Bush Foreign Policy ‘Is Creating Risks for U.S. Companies,’” *Financial Times*, November 11, 2003, 11.
58. Andrew C. Revkin and Neela Banerjee, “Energy Executives Urge Voluntary Greenhouse-Gas Limits,” *New York Times*, August 1, 2001, C1.
59. Jeffrey Immelt, “A Consistent Policy on Cleaner Energy,” *Financial Times*, June 29, 2005, 17.
60. The United States abstained on the resolution, thereby allowing it to be adopted.
61. United States Institute of Peace, *American Interests and UN Reform: Report of the Task Force on the United Nation* (Washington, DC: USIP, 2005).
62. Kagan, “America’s Crisis of Legitimacy,” *Foreign Affairs* 83 (March–April 2004).